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Most models of epidemic spread, including many designed specifically for COVID-19, implicitly
assume that social networks are undirected, i.e., that the infection is equally likely to spread in either
direction whenever a contact occurs. In particular, this assumption implies that the individuals most
likely to spread the disease are also the most likely to receive it from others. Here, we review results
from the theory of random directed graphs which show that many important quantities, including
the reproductive number and the epidemic size, depend sensitively on the joint distribution of in- and
out-degrees (“risk” and “spread”), including their heterogeneity and the correlation between them.
By considering joint distributions of various kinds we elucidate why some types of heterogeneity
cause a deviation from the standard Kermack-McKendrick analysis of SIR models, i.e., so called
mass-action models where contacts are homogeneous and random, and some do not. We also show
that some structured SIR models informed by complex contact patterns among types of individuals
(age or activity) are simply mixtures of Poisson processes and tend not to deviate significantly
from the simplest mass-action model. Finally, we point out some possible policy implications of
this directed structure, both for contact tracing strategy and for interventions designed to prevent
super spreading events. In particular, directed networks have a forward and backward version of
the classic “friendship paradox” — forward links tend to lead to individuals with high risk, while
backward links lead to individuals with high spread — such that a combination of both forward and
backward contact tracing is necessary to find superspreading events and prevent future cascades of
infection.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of network epidemiology, populations of hosts are modeled as a graph, where nodes are individuals and
links are contacts along which infectious diseases can spread [1]. Here, we review important concepts from the study
of random graphs to inform our understanding of epidemics. We explain how these concepts and results can be used
on the one hand to inform interventions and guide policy, and on the other hand to solve common nonlinear models of
epidemic spread based on differential equations. Our paper is structured such that the main text focuses on concepts
and insights, with all mathematical details presented in complementary (optional) boxes and in our mathematical
Appendix.
To model epidemic spreading with graphs, we define links or contacts as interactions that will transmit the disease
from one individual to another should one individual becomes infectious. We can then analyze various compartmental
epidemic models (e.g., SIR, SEIR, etc.) and how they depend on the structure of the resulting graphs [2–5]. For
the simplest random graphs, epidemics end up being equivalent to classic, mass-action compartmentalized models in
epidemiology, which can be analyzed using systems of differential equations. For instance, the SIR model on Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random graphs, where every pair of nodes is independently connected with the same probability, behaves like
the Kermack–McKendrick SIR solution in the limit where the number of nodes, i.e. the population size, is large [6–8].
However, graphs allow us to model many kinds of heterogeneity and structure, and explore how and when hetero-
geneity affects epidemic thresholds and sizes. Since the degree of a node is the number of links or contacts it has, we
can model superspreading events (SSEs) by having a heavy-tailed degree distribution, where some nodes have degree
considerably larger than the mean [9]. A random contact is more likely to be with a high-degree individual, who has
more secondary contacts in turn. Thus the average degree of a node hit by a random contact is greater than the
average degree of a random node. This phenomenon is often called the “friendship paradox”: on average, your friends
have more friends than you do [10]. In the epidemic context it has two effects. First, the reproductive number is not
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FIG. 1. Different types of individuals in a directed graph model of disease spread: a. low-risk, but high-spread, b. high-risk,
but low-spread, and c. high-risk and high-spread.
simply the mean degree; it depends also on its second moment or variance (see Box I). In particular, even if we hold
the mean degree constant, increasing the variance lowers the critical transmission rate–i.e., the per contact probability
of transmission needed to reach the epidemic threshold [2]. Second, as developed by [11–13] and recently pointed out
as highly relevant for COVID-19 in [14, 15], the “friendship paradox”can amplify the effectiveness of contact tracing,
giving a better chance that a contact leads to a SSE, helping us prevent further cascades of infection.
However, these results on SSEs assume that the graph is undirected: that is, links are equally likely to spread the
disease in either direction. While this may be true for individuals who attend a group event or work together in
close quarters, some some mechanisms of spread, such as surface contacts from handling and delivery, are inherently
directed [16]. In network terms, an individual might have high out-degree (e.g. a high viral load if infected) but low
in-degree (a low risk of receiving the infection from others), or vice versa. In addition, many non-pharmaceutical
interventions to prevent disease spread have a directed effect. Wearing a simple mask is one such mechanism, as it is
believed to reduce the probability that the wearer spreads a respiratory disease like COVID-19 to others, but not to
strongly protect the wearer from receiving the disease from others [17, 18].
For epidemics where directed effects are important, so that for some contacts transmission is likely in one direction
but unlikely or impossible in the other, a better network model is a directed graph [16, 19–22]. Here each node has
an in-degree, i.e., the number of contacts from whom it could receive the disease, and an out-degree, the number of
contacts to whom it could spread the disease if it becomes infected. We can think of the in-degree as the risk of
this individual, and the out-degree as their spread. As illustrated in Fig. 1, an individual might contribute to rapid
spreading by having high risk, high spread, or both. For instance, an average immunocompromised individual might
have high risk but low spread, while someone who fails to wear a mask even while those around them do might have
low risk and high spread. Finally, someone who by choice or necessity interacts with many others in close quarters
would have both high risk and high spread, as in the traditional undirected picture of SSEs.
This distinction between risk and spread, or between incoming and outgoing links, has several consequences. First,
the reproductive number is proportional to the correlation between risk and spread (see Box II). More precisely, the
contribution of a given node to the reproductive number is proportional to the product of its in- and out-degrees.
Nodes with both high risk and high spread are likely to become infected and then infect many others. But if they
have high risk and low spread, or vice versa, then the number of new cases they are likely to generate is smaller.
This has possible implications for non-pharmaceutical interventions: the effect of reducing an individual’s spread is
proportional to their risk, and vice versa.
Second, we now have two distinct types of friendship paradox (see Box III). Outgoing links connect to nodes with
probability proportional to their in-degree, so following a link forward will tend to take us to individuals with high risk.
Incoming links, in contrast, come from nodes with probability proportional to their out-degree, so going backward
Box I: Undirected graphs and the degree variance
If P (k) is the degree distribution, i.e., the fraction of nodes with degree k, then the average excess degree, or the expected
number of secondary contacts resulting from a random contact, is
R0 =
∑
k k(k − 1)P (k)∑
k kP (k)
=
〈k2〉
〈k〉 − 1 = 〈k〉+
Var k
〈k〉 − 1 . (1)
An epidemic occurs when R0 > 1. For the Poisson degree distribution we have Var k = 〈k〉 and thus R0 = 〈k〉, but for
distributions with larger variance we have R0 > 〈k〉. This is the friendship paradox: a random friend of yours has more
friends, on average, than you do (even not counting you).
3Box II: Directed graphs and correlation between risk and spread
In a directed graph, each node has an in-degree kin and an out-degree kout. We associate these respectively with their
risk, the number of contacts from whom they could receive the infection, and their spread, the number of contacts to
whom they could transmit it. The degree distribution is then a joint distribution, giving the fraction P (i, j) of nodes
with kin = i and kout = j. Since the total number of incoming and outgoing links must match, the mean in-degree and
the mean out-degree are equal:
〈kin〉 =
∑
i,j
iP (i, j) = 〈kout〉 =
∑
i,j
jP (i, j) = 〈k〉 . (2)
In the directed configuration model of random graphs [23], we assume that nodes are connected to each other randomly
conditioned on their in- and out-degrees. The “heads” of the directed links are randomly matched with their “tails,”
and each outgoing link arrives at a given node with probability proportional to that node’s in-degree. (This method
of constructing a random graph can give rise to self-loops or parallel links, but in sparse networks these are rare.) In
the limit of large population size, we can also say that for each pair of nodes a, b there is a link a→ b with probability
kout(a)kin(b)/m where m = 〈k〉n is the total number of links.
The reproductive number, or the expected number of secondary contacts resulting from a random contact, is
R0 =
∑
i,j ijP (i, j)∑
i,j iP (i, j)
=
〈kinkout〉
〈k〉 (3)
Just as R0 depends on the variance of the degree distribution in the undirected case, it now depends on the covariance,
or correlation, between the in- and out-degrees. In particular, the contribution of each individual to the reproductive
number is proportional to the product of their risk and their spread.
tends to take us to individuals with high spread.
This suggests that if we want to find SSEs, and thus prevent a large number of downstream cases, it may be
important to perform backward contract tracing, determining the source of an index case, rather than focusing only
on forward contact tracing, finding those who the index case may have infected. As shown in Box III, the average
spread of the predecessor of an index case is larger than that of an average successor, especially if the spread has high
variance, except in the unusual case where risk and spread are almost perfectly correlated. This insight also implies
that the time window we use to define relevant contacts should include their likely predecessor as well as the likely
successors of an index case. We can then trace the “siblings” of the index case, i.e., others who were infected by the
same source, and prevent a larger number of future cases.
II. EPIDEMIC PROBABILITY AND EPIDEMIC SIZE
Here we review some results of Refs. [24, 25] from random graph theory which show how to calculate the epidemic
size of SIR-like models with directed transmission, as a function of the joint distribution of risk and spread. We
note that these results can be generalized [26, 27] and expanded to include semi-directed networks with a mixture of
directed and undirected links [16, 28].
As mentioned above, we define the graph as the links a→ b that will transmit the disease from a to b if a becomes
infected. More generally this transmission would occur with some probability, so these links form a randomly chosen
subnetwork of the potentially infectious contacts. The probabilistic case can be handled with the same methods, and
we give an example in Box VI in Appendix.
Let’s first compute the epidemic probability, i.e., the probability that a single infected individual generates a
macroscopic epidemic as opposed to a small outbreak. It helps to think of a process where links, rather than nodes,
propagate from one generation to the next. An outgoing link produces j “children,” or secondary contacts, if the link
arrives at a node with out-degree j. A classic question in the theory of branching processes is whether the resulting
tree of contacts is finite or infinite. Since the total number of descendants of a link is finite if and only if this is true
of all of its children, the probability of this event obeys a fixed-point equation which can be written compactly using
probability generating functions (see Box IV).
Now consider the epidemic size. Nodes receive the infection from their predecessors, who receive it from their
predecessors in turn. This leads to a backwards branching process of incoming links, where a link has i “children” (or
perhaps we should call them parents now) if it comes from a node with in-degree i. If a node has only a finite number
of ancestors in this tree, then with high probability none of them will be the initial node and it will remain uninfected.
4Box III: Forward and backward friendship paradoxes and contact tracing
Suppose we are performing contact tracing from an index case. Since the probability a given individual is their
predecessor (the source of their infection) is proportional to their out-degree or spread, the average excess spread of
their predecessor—that is, the number of “siblings” with the same predecessor—is
〈kout〉predecessor =
∑
i,j j(j − 1)P (i, j)∑
i,j jP (i, j)
=
〈k2out〉
〈k〉 − 1 = 〈k〉+
Var kout
〈k〉 − 1 . (4)
Similarly, the probability a given individual is a successor of the index case is proportional to their in-degree or risk, so
the average excess risk of a successor is
〈kin〉predecessor =
∑
i,j i(i− 1)P (i, j)∑
i,j iP (i, j)
=
〈k2in〉
〈k〉 − 1 = 〈k〉+
Var kin
〈k〉 − 1 . (5)
These are the backward and forward friendship paradoxes: the predecessor of a random node tends to have high spread,
but a successor tends to have high risk, especially when both of these have high variance. On the other hand, the
average spread of a successor is just the reproductive number calculated in (3) above,
〈kout〉successor = R0 = 〈kinkout〉〈k〉 . (6)
Comparing this with (4), we see that if the spread kout has high variance then the predecessor has larger spread on
average than a successor, unless the risk and spread are almost perfectly correlated, i.e., unless 〈kinkout〉 ≥ 〈k2out〉 − 1.
This insight highlights the conclusion of Ref. [15] that contact tracing strategies should include tracing backwards from
the index case as well as forwards. In fact, this recommendation becomes critical once we consider the directionality of
contacts such that risk and spread might not be perfectly correlated.
But if it has a macroscopic (i.e. infinite) number of ancestors, then with high probability one of its ancestors will
become infected and it will too. Thus the epidemic size is equal to the epidemic probability in a time-reversed model,
where the disease spreads backward from each node to its predecessors.
On undirected graphs, these forward and backward branching processes are the same, and the probability they die
out obeys the same fixed-point equation. This leads to the classic observation in the SIR model that the epidemic
size equals the epidemic probability. In the directed case, however, these are typically different, a fact which was
pointed out in Ref. [16]. In the next section, we consider degree distributions of various kinds and with varying levels
of correlation between risk and spread, and look at how these types of heterogeneity effect their epidemic size.
III. EXAMPLES
Let us first consider a simple, random, undirected graph, as illustrated in Fig. 2(a-b). Its structure is fully specified
by its degree distribution, which sets the number of contacts leading to and from a given node, such that kin = kout = k.
As shown in Ref. [29], the epidemic size obtained on these graphs corresponds to the classic Kermack-McKendrick
solution if and only if the degree distribution is Poisson, i.e., P (k) = 〈k〉ke−〈k〉/k!. What is so special about this
distribution? As it turns out, the Poisson distribution is the only one where the excess degree has the same distribution
as the degree itself: the probability a link leads to k secondary contacts equals the probability that a random node
has k contacts. In terms of the friendship paradox, the probability you have k friends is the same as the probability
your friend has k friends in addition to you. In particular, these two distributions have the same mean, so R0 = 〈k〉.
This is similar to the mass-action hypothesis of Kermack and McKendrick since it implies that information about the
contact structure does not matter. For any other degree distribution — even a more homogeneous one as in Fig. 2(a)
— the distribution of excess degrees is different from the degree distribution, and the Kermack-McKendrick solution
for the epidemic size does not apply.
Consider now a directed version of the Poisson graph. As shown in Fig. 2(c), we can think of undirected links
as bidirectional contacts, i.e., pairs of directed links, and make this directionality explicit before randomizing the
incoming and outgoing links. What we now have is a graph where kin = kout = k, still drawn from a Poisson
distribution, but where incoming and outgoing neighbours are different. Do we expect the Kermack-McKendrick
solution to correctly predict epidemic size? Even if the construction of the directed graph structure is very close to
that of the undirected case, this directed version actually does not fall back on the Kermack-McKendrick solution.
One key difference can be observed around transmission dead-ends, i.e., nodes with kout = 0, which are now impossible
5Box IV: Generating functions and epidemic size
Given the degree distribution P (i, j), we can define a probability generating function (PGF)
G(x, y) =
∞∑
i,j=0
P (i, j)xiyj . (7)
Many quantities can be written compactly in terms of G and its derivatives, including the average in- and out-degrees (2)
and the reproductive number (3):
〈kin〉 = ∂G
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=y=1
= 〈kout〉 = ∂G
∂y
∣∣∣∣
x=y=1
= 〈k〉 , R0 = 1〈k〉
∂2G
∂x∂y
∣∣∣∣
x=y=1
=
〈kinkout〉
〈k〉 . (8)
We can also use G to analyze branching processes on the network. In the forward branching process of an outbreak,
the probability Qout(j) that a random contact results in j secondary contacts, i.e., that a random link arrives at a node
of out-degree j, is
Qout(j) =
∑
i iP (kin, j)∑
i,j iP (i, j)
=
1
〈k〉
∑
i
iP (i, j) . (9)
We can write a generating function for Qout in terms of G,
Fout(y) =
∑
j
Qout(j)y
j =
1
〈k〉
∂G(x, y)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=1
(10)
Now let uout be the probability that a link has a finite number of descendants, i.e., that it will lead to a finite outbreak
rather than an epidemic. This is true if it is true for all j of its children. Since these are independent, averaging over j
gives the fixed-point equation
uout =
∑
j
Qout(j)u
j
out = Fout(uout) , (11)
of which uout is the smallest positive solution. Finally, since a node with out-degree j generates an epidemic with
probability 1− ujout, the probability that infecting a random initial node leads to an epidemic is
P ≡ 1−
∑
i,j
P (i, j)ujout = 1−G(1, uout) . (12)
To compute the epidemic size, we consider the backwards branching process of incoming links. The probability Qin(i)
that a link comes from a node with in-degree i, and the corresponding generating function, is
Qin(i) =
1
〈k〉
∑
j
jP (i, j) and Fin(x) =
∑
i
Qin(i)x
i =
1
〈k〉
∂G(x, y)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=1
. (13)
The probability uin that a link has a finite number of ancestors is then the smallest positive solution of
uin =
∑
i
Qin(i)u
i
in = Fin(uin) , (14)
Finally, a node with in-degree i becomes infected with probability 1− uiin, so the size of the epidemic is
S ≡ 1−
∑
i,j
P (i, j)uiin = 1−G(uin, 1) . (15)
6FIG. 2. Four examples of transmission graphs, their construction and correspondence to the Kermack-McKendrick analysis.
(a) An undirected graph where all nodes are exactly the same, showing that too much homogeneity is different from mass-action
mixing. (b) A simple undirected, Poisson graph: The fish out of water. Poisson graphs can be represented with a network
structure but make predictions that fall back exactly on classic mass-action models and therefore fail to include important
network effects. (c) We take the undirected, Poisson graph and add directions to all links (left graph). This procedure
preserves the in- and out-degree for all nodes. We then rewire the directed links to obtain a simple graph without overlap
between contacts (right graph). Should we expect the Kermack-McKendrick solution to correctly predict the epidemic size
as it did in the original undirected graph? No. (d) A directed graph obtained by independently specifying an in-degree
distribution (here Poisson) and an out-degree distribution (here fairly heterogeneous). This corresponds to a situation where
all individuals have similar risk of infection, but allowing for superspreading events. Proofs of mapping (or lack thereof) to the
Kermack-McKendrick solution are available in the Appendix.
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FIG. 3. (left) Impact of heterogeneity and correlations on final epidemic size. We compare different case-studies to the
Kermack-McKendrick solution to illustrate the importance of heterogeneity and correlations. Importantly, we show that
increasing correlations always lead to lower final epidemic size, and that their effect is larger for higher heterogeneity in out-
degree. (right) We compare our multitype directed Poisson random graph to numerical integrations of the model of Ref. [30]
and again to the Kermack-McKendrick solution. This comparison showcases the generality of our approach and illustrates how
a mixture of Poisson processes tend to not deviate significantly from the mass-action prediction.
to reach. To recover equivalency with the Kermack-McKendrick solution, we need to decorrelate in- and out-degrees.
On the other hand, it turns out that some naive approaches to modeling heterogeneity do not, in fact, alter the
epidemic size at all. Consider the following kind of simulation, which we would run until there are no new infectious
individuals and where Pout is an arbitrary distribution of out-degrees:
1. Start with a single new infectious case in an otherwise susceptible population of size N .
2. For each new infectious individual i, draw a number kout of transmissions from the out-degree distribution Pout.
3. Randomly select kout individuals from the population. For each one, if it is susceptible then mark it as newly
infectious and go to step 2, otherwise do nothing.
This type of simulation can give transmission trees similar to the example shown in Fig. 2(d). While the out-degree
distribution Pout can be arbitrarily heterogeneous, including various kinds of superspreading, the incoming links fall
with equal probability on every susceptible individual because of the random selection of neighbours in step 3. As
a result, the distribution of risk or in-degree is in fact Poisson, and the in- and out-degrees are uncorrelated. As we
show in the next section, in the limit of large N , the typical epidemic size produced by this kind of simulation exactly
corresponds to the Kermack-McKendrick solution regardless of the out-degree distribution Pout.
These simple examples suggest that the Kermack-McKendrick solution relies on (i) a Poisson distribution of risk
among individuals and (ii) a lack of correlation between risk and spread. It does not actually rely on homogeneous
spread but only on the independence between the infection risk faced by an individual and the number of secondary
infections caused by that individual if infected. The undirected Poisson case, where this independence does not hold
since the in- and out-degrees are identical by definition, is somewhat unique since the lack of backtracking and the
friendship paradox balance out. We formalize this intuition mathematically in the Appendix, and some important
results are visually summarized in Fig. 3(left).
IV. CONNECTION WITH STRUCTURED DIFFERENTIAL EQUATION MODELS
The mathematical analysis presented thus far is completely general and exact on very large random directed graphs.
However, it requires us to know or assume the distributions of both risk and spread around individuals such that it
tells us nothing about the mechanisms underlying their heterogeneity and correlations (or lack thereof).
One particularly powerful and common approach in current models of the COVID-19 pandemic is age-structured
SIR or SEIR models (e.g., Ref. [30, 32, 33]) where individuals are separated in different types based on their age and
where contacts between age groups are specified through a contact (or “mixing”) matrix. This approach is powerful
8Box V: Poisson mixture model
We consider a general case in which there are M types of nodes and where a fraction wl of the nodes are of type l. We
assume that the in-degrees and the out-degrees are uncorrelated, and that the contribution to the in-degree from each
node type is independent and distributed according to a Poisson distribution. Thus, a PGF Gl is defined for each node
type and has the general form
Gl(x,y) = exp
[
M∑
r=1
zinlr (xr − 1)
]
Gout(y) , (16)
where zinlr is the average number of incoming links type-l nodes receive from nodes of type r; the average in-degree of
type-l nodes is therefore equal to
∑
r z
in
lr . Akin to Eq. (2), the average in- and out-degrees between any pair of node
types are related via
wiz
out
ij = wjz
in
ji . (17)
Following Ref. [31], the size of a macroscopic outbreak is
S = 1−
M∑
l=1
wlGl(u
in,1) (18)
where uin = (uin1 , . . . , u
in
M ) is the solution of
uinl = exp
[
M∑
r=1
zinrl(u
in
r − 1)
]
(19)
for l = 1, . . . ,M . The reproductive number, R0 = ρ(Z), is equal to the spectral radius of the matrix Z whose elements
are zinrl .
because it allows modeller to include important sources of heterogeneity such as different susceptibilities and likelihood
of symptoms based on age, and also allows an easy parametrization of interventions such as school closures and/or
lockdowns through the contact matrix.
Let us now define Si(t), Ii(t) and R(t) as the numbers of Susceptible, Infectious, and Recovered individuals in group
i at time t. These structured models follow the SIR dynamics through a set of ordinary differential equations written
as
S˙i(t) = −βσi
∑
j
Mi,j
Ij
N
Si
I˙i(t) = βσi
∑
j
Mi,j
Ij
N
Si + γIi (20)
R˙i(t) = γIi
where β is the baseline transmission rate of the disease, σi the group-dependent susceptibility of individuals, Mi,j
is the average number of contacts from someone in group i to people in group j , and γ the recovery rate of the
disease. Note that these equations are perfectly equivalent to the model described in the Supplementary Materials
of Ref. [30].The equations can be understood as setting a Poisson distribution of in-degree with average βσiMi,j/γ
coming from group j for all individuals in group i. The model therefore corresponds to a mixture of directed Poisson
processes and it is unclear how much we should expect these models to differ from the much simpler, undirected and
unstructured, mass-action SIR.
We apply our framework to a multitype directed graph [34] (see Box V) where the type of a node corresponds to
their age group and where direction allows us to consider heterogeneous susceptibility. As shown in Fig. 3(right),
the multitype directed graph approach exactly solves for the final epidemic size produced by the system presented in
Eq. (20). Our solution thus provide a general solution, as a set of polynomial equations, to exactly solve structured
SIR-like models. Perhaps more importantly, this solution highlights how the solution of such systems is actually
a simple mixture of Poisson processes and therefore a combination of Kermack-McKendrick-like terms. As can be
observed in Fig. 3(right), this implies that if the average R0 is large enough (say, greater than 1.5), the result is
unlikely to deviate much from the pure Kermack-McKendrick solution given that it is composed of a combination
of Kermack-McKendrick terms which are all drawn from relatively flat function. Such models, which are usually
9composed of a handful to a couple dozen types of nodes, can not truly embrace the full heterogeneity of risk and
spread produced by biology, demographics and human behaviour.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reviewed key results from directed random graphs to clarify the role of heterogeneity and correla-
tions in the risk and spread distributions of an infectious disease. We focused on identifying when the final epidemic
size would deviate from the classic Kermack-McKendrick solution.
In particular, we note that heterogeneity implemented in classic differential equation models by having a small
number of different types of individuals (representing, for example, age, occupation, susceptibility, and/or activity
level) did not significantly affect epidemic size. Such structured models implement heterogeneity through a mixture
of Poisson processes which individually all correspond to Kermack-McKendrick-like contributions and therefore can
not deviate significantly from their average.
That such models do not deviate significantly from Kermack-McKendrick, has three main implications. First,
since differential equations are deterministic by nature, the heterogeneity is here implemented through in-degree only,
affecting solely the epidemic size, while failing to capture the probability of such an epidemic which is set by the
out-degree distribution. Second, our solution for such models could prove useful to gather more analytical insights
without relying on numerical integration of differential equations. And third, it also shows how the data needed to
parametrize contact patterns between groups might not always be worth the effort considering the robustness of the
underlying Poisson assumption.
Altogether, our derivation of the Kermack-McKendrick result on directed transmission trees highlight that the
critical assumption behind their solution is not mass-action mixing per se but instead based on Poisson risk. Therefore,
any model or simulation software will fall back on the classic mass-action result if the numbers of secondary cases
caused by an infectious individual are randomly selected from the population, no matter how heterogeneous those
numbers might be. And since we are usually focused on epidemic size more than epidemic probability, the impact of
heterogeneity on epidemic size is driven by high-risk individuals first and superspreading events second.
For emerging infectious diseases, especially those like COVID-19 where no proven pharmaceutical therapies nor
prophylactic exist, our results highlight the critical need for detailed, contact tracing studies. These studies should
quantify both the incoming and outgoing risk of transmission and quantify the relative contribution of these risks
during the epidemic. Indeed, the efficacy of measures such as digital contact tracing [35] and “immune shielding” [36]
will depend on how risk and contact heterogeneity are patterned across populations. Only through the application of
models able to capture relevant heterogeneity, to do empirical data on contact networks and risk, can the efficacy of
such non-pharmaceutical interventions be accurately determined.
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Appendix A: Mathematical case studies
In this Appendix, we formally solve for the final epidemic size found in directed graphs representing different models
of disease spread, including the examples used in Section III.
1. Uncorrelated in- and out-degrees
Let us first illustrate the formalism when in- and out-degree are independent. Denoting their respective PGFs by
Gin(x) and Gout(y), Eqs. (7), (11), (12), (14) and (15) become
G(x, y) = G(x, 1)G(1, y) = Gin(x)Gout(y) (A1)
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and
uout = Gout(uout) ; P = 1−Gout(uout) ; (A2a)
uin = Gin(uin) ; S = 1−Gin(uin) . (A2b)
We conclude that the size of a macroscopic outbreak, S, is solely dictated by the distribution of the in-degrees, i.e. by
the distribution of the risk of individuals, while the probability for an outbreak to become macroscopic depends only
on the distribution of spread. Moreover, we see from Eq. (3) that the number of secondary infections from patient
zero and from secondary cases are equal, that is
R0 =
〈kinkout〉
〈k〉 =
〈kin〉〈kout〉
〈k〉 = 〈k〉 , (A3)
and conclude therefore that there is no “friendship paradox effect” (from the excess degree distribution) when in- and
out-degree are not correlated.
2. Derivation of Kermack-McKendrick
In addition to being independent from the out-degrees, if we assume that the in-degrees are distributed according
to a Poisson distribution, that is if Gin(x) = e
〈k〉(x−1), Eq. (A2b) (see Box II) becomes
uin = e
〈k〉(uin−1) ; S = 1− e〈k〉(uin−1) (A4a)
from which we obtain the results by Kermack-McKendrick for the size of an epidemic [6–8]
S = 1− eR0S . (A5)
We conclude that the predictions for the size of a macroscopic outbreak will coincide with the Kermack-McKendrick
solution if the in-degrees and not correlated with the out-degrees and if they are distributed according to a Poisson
distribution.
Box VI: Poisson and binomial degree sequences and probabilistic transmission
If the in-degree is Poisson-distributed with mean 〈k〉, its PGF is
Gin(x) =
∞∑
i=0
P (i)xi =
∞∑
i=0
e−〈k〉〈k〉i
i!
xi = e〈k〉(x−1) . (A6)
As discussed in the text, with R0 = 〈k〉 this leads to the same prediction for the epidemic size as Kermack-McKendrick.
Another degree distribution that might result from an epidemic simulation is where each individual has d contacts, each
of which transmits the disease with probability q. Then 〈k〉 = qd and the distribution of in-degrees is binomial, giving
the PGF
Gin(x) =
d∑
i=0
P (i)xi =
d∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
qi(1− q)d−ixi = (1 + q(x− 1))d = (1 + 〈k〉(x− 1)
d
)d
. (A7)
When d is large, the identity (1 + w/d)d ≈ ew applies, giving the same PGF (A6) as the Poisson case and again
recovering the Kermack-McKendrick prediction for epidemic size.
3. Full correlation
Let us now investigate the effect of a perfect correlation between individual risk and spread, which can be encoded
as
G(x, y) =
∞∑
i,j=0
Pin(i)δijx
iyj =
∞∑
i=0
Pin(i)(xy)
i ≡ Gin(xy) , (A8)
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where Pin(i) is the in-degree, or risk, distribution. Note that full correlation does not imply that links are reciprocal
(i.e. links run in both directions between nodes, which would be equivalent to undirected graphs). Equations (11),
(12), (14) and (15) become
uout =
[
1
〈k〉
∂Gin(xy)
∂x
]
x=1
y=uout
; P = 1−Gin(uout) ; (A9a)
uin =
[
1
〈k〉
∂Gin(xy)
∂y
]
x=uin
y=1
; S = 1−Gin(uin) . (A9b)
We conclude that in the presence of full correlation, the size and the probability of a macroscopic outbreak are equal.
Also, Eq. (3) shows that
R0 =
〈k2〉
〈k〉 (A10)
which differs from its undirected counterpart (i.e. R0 = 〈k(k − 1)〉/〈k〉 [24]).
As shown in Ref. [29], the undirected case, in which in- and out-degrees are perfectly correlated by construction,
falls back on the result of Kermack-McKendrick when the degrees are distributed according to a Poisson distribution.
However, this results does not extend to fully-correlated directed networks. Indeed, substituting Gin(x) = e
〈k〉(x−1)
in Eq. (A9b) yields only two solutions uin = 0, 1 for all 〈k〉. The probability for a macroscopic outbreak and its size
are therefore equal to the fraction of nodes with nonzero in-/out-degree
S = P = 1− e−〈k〉 , (A11)
and Eq. (A10) yields R0 = 〈k〉+ 1, since a node that has been infected can always infect at least one other node.
4. Arbitrary correlations
To explore scenarios in-between the limiting correlation cases above, we consider the following PGF which allows to
fix the marginal out-degree distribution and to interpolate between full correlation (a = 1) and independence (a = 0)
G(x, y) = [Gout(xy)]
a[Gin(x)Gout(y)]
1−a . (A12)
Note that in the case of full correlations, the in-degrees are distributed according to Gout. Equations (11), (12), (14)
and (15) become
uout = a
[
1
〈k〉
∂Gout(xy)
∂x
]
x=1
y=uout
+ (1− a)Gout(uout) (A13a)
P = 1−Gout(uout) (A13b)
uin = a
[
Gin(uin)
Gout(uin)
]1−a [
1
〈k〉
∂Gout(xy)
∂y
]
x=uin
y=1
+ (1− a)
[
Gout(uin)
Gin(uin)
]a
Gin(uin) (A13c)
S = 1− [Gout(uin)]a[Gin(uin)]1−a . (A13d)
From Eq. (3), we find that
R0 = (1− a)〈k〉+ a 〈k
2
out〉
〈k〉 . (A14)
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